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Abstract 
The Israeli economy is a small, centralized economy, in which most of it public traded companies have an absolute 
controlling core. Therefore, it is increasingly important to understand the parameters that influence the results of 
rights issues and whether they usually lead to a significant “expropriation” of minority rights. The literature, which 
describes the agency problem inherent in rights issues at length, does not include an abundance of empirical studies 
on the impact of rights issues on minority rights. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that examines 
the impact of rights issues, the dilution of minority holdings and various factors’ influence on the intensity of the 
dilution in a developed country. The significance of the main parameters and their impact on the dilution result 
support the accepted opinion in the economic literature, which casts a negative light on rights issues as an instrument 
that leads to the dilution of minority rights. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility 7th International 
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1. Introduction 
Economic literature describes at length the dangers inherent in the creation of an agency problem in a 
public company. Among other effects, this problem can lead to rights issues becoming a potential means 
that the agent (the holder of the controlling interest, in this case) uses to dilute the holdings of the 
minority shareholders. Concretely, the literature describes the problem inherent in choosing an instrument 
for raising capital that is convenient for the controlling shareholders (and perhaps for the company, too) 
but not necessarily optimal for the minority shareholders.  
In should be noted that all of the current literature is either qualitative, theoretical discussions of the 
problem of agency against the background of minority issues or quantitative, empirical examinations of 
the effect (usually negative) of rights issues on the price of shares. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first study that examines the impact of rights issues, the dilution of minority holdings and various 
factors’ influence on the intensity of the dilution. 
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It should be clear that a rights issue is an instrument for raising capital that allows the company to sell 
new shares only to existing shareholders; the allocations are proportional to their holdings prior to the 
issue. At the same time, shareholders who are not interested in purchasing additional shares are usually 
permitted to trade in the rights, sell them or receive a cash payment for them. Despite the apparently equal 
allocation of rights and their negotiability, this is not necessarily an egalitarian process; rather it is likely 
to become a way to dilute the holdings of minority shareholders. In the literature, this phenomenon is 
known as “expropriation” and it occurs particularly when the equal allocation of rights occurs at a time 
when the financial situation (capital gap or liquidity) of the shareholders is unequal and/or they do not 
have equal access to information about the company’s future and/or their willingness to take risks 
(obviously related to the information issue) as expressed in the flexibility of their investments in the 
company’s shares is not equal to the controlling shareholders willingness to take risks as expressed by the 
flexibility of their investment. 
The structure of the article is as follows: the second section describes the theoretical background, 
including a review of the relevant literature and the third section includes a brief description of rights 
issues in Israel. The fourth section lays out the empirical foundation, based on economic literature, which 
makes it possible to estimate the impact of rights issues on the size of the minority’s holdings while the 
fifth section presents the results of the empirical estimation for the sample period, 2000-2009. A brief 
summary and some of the resultant conclusions appear in the sixth part. 
2. Theoretical background 
The existence of a controlling core of shareholders, very common in Israel, makes it possible for the 
controlling shareholders to select the directors who actually manage the company. By law, the directors 
are obligated to act for the good of the company, including the shareholders and all other stakeholders 
(employees, customers, suppliers, etc.). Despite this, their dependence on the party who appointed them 
sometimes causes directors to mind the interests of the controlling shareholders rather than those of the 
company and its shareholders as a whole. This leads to the phenomenon referred to as the “agency 
problem” or “agency theory.”  
The formal expression of the theory was authored by Jensen and Meckling [1] (1976) who stated that 
the agency problem can explain why shares are allocated with preferred (meaning, discriminatory) 
conditions. In this framework they showed that it is almost never possible to ensure that the “agent” (the 
directors in the case of widely -distributed shares and the controlling shareholders when the shareholding 
is concentrated) will act according to the interest of all shareholders unless there is a supervisory 
mechanism or significant alternative. The main point is that the controlling shareholders are, naturally, 
partners in only part of the company’s profits and it is, therefore, in their interest to take advantage of 
their power as managers and controlling shareholders in order to transfer the company’s resources to them 
alone (rather than being required to share them with other shareholders). 
The literature describes a variety of methods (see for example Johnson et al [2], 2000) that make it 
possible for the agent, a controlling shareholder or director, to take advantage of his standing at the 
expense of his fellow shareholders: paying himself an extraordinary salary; appointing family members to 
senior positions and granting them, and his associates, extraordinary conditions; internal transactions with 
other companies owned by the agent at prices that effectively transfer profits from the company, which 
were deposited in the agent’s hands, to other companies in his ownership (presumably one where he holds 
a larger share than in the company he exploited) or unequal distribution of the joint investments and a 
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variety of financial moves intended to dilute the status of minority shareholders, including taking 
advantage of rights issues, which has the most prominent place in literature. 
In this context, Singhai [3] (2002) emphasizes that the attempt to harm the property of shareholders 
through a rights issue (which he refers to as “expropriation”) is one of the most important branches of the 
agency problem for public companies (meaning, companies traded on a stock exchange) particularly 
when there is a pyramid holding structure. Furthermore, he states that foreign investors are frequently the 
ones who are forced to accept dilution. 
Furthermore, the literature also warns against taking advantage of financial crises, in a particular 
company or in the economy as a whole, to issue rights or take other financial actions that will expropriate 
rights of the minority. It should be noted that when rights are issued against the background of a crisis 
(either particular or general), the shareholders are confronted with two undesirable alternatives: increasing 
their investment in order to maintain their holding despite the high risk (because of the aforementioned 
crisis) or suffer a significant dilution at a non-worthwhile price. In effect, the latter option is equivalent to 
realizing some of the investment in cash (because of the benefit commonly included in rights issues, 
shareholders who do not realize their rights may sell them in the market, which increases the downward 
pressure on the share’s price) and at an undesirable time and conditions, from their perspective (or, at 
least, not at the time and conditions that they would choose as optimal). Conversely, the controlling 
shareholder of a public company has access to several acceptable ways for increasing his holdings, 
including purchasing shares in the free market or making purchase offers.  
As noted above, the literature warns that a rights issue is an instrument that the agent can use at the 
expense of other shareholders. However, this should not construe to mean that a rights issue is, by 
definition, an illegitimate capital instrument. Furthermore, it should be stated explicitly that sometimes a 
company has no other way to raise capital. 
Indeed, Wang and Wang [4] (2005) show that the implications of the agent problem, for rights issues, 
help explain two interesting phenomena. First, there are relatively few rights issues in the US capital 
market, where the number of companies controlled by a controlling interest is low and relatively more in 
Europe, where a larger number of companies have a significant controlling interest. Second, despite the 
stronger negative reaction of the European capital market to capital issues, in comparison to the reaction 
in the United States, rights issues are actually very common in Europe. 
  
The theory they developed demonstrates that because a rights issue is an instrument that can 
discriminate in favor of the controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders but cannot 
benefit managers at the expense of shareholders, it is unpopular in the United States and popular in 
Europe. Correspondingly, the value of the free shares (those not belonging to the controlling interest) 
traded in capital markets suffers more harm in Europe following the announcement of an upcoming rights 
issue (thereby reflecting the damage a concrete rights issue does to the minority shares and the future 
damage expected in case of recurrent issues) than does the value of free shares in the United States 
following a similar announcement. Myers and Majlof [5] (1984) supply a theoretical foundation, as does 
Smith [6] (1977) who shows that American companies prefer regular issues, even though the direct cost is 
higher, over rights issues with their lower direct costs.  
To avoid any doubt, the economic literature describes and discredits the common reasons that 
management gives to justify rights issues, despite the significant damage they are likely to cause. This 
category includes reasons relating to the lower direct cost of a rights issue in comparison to a direct issue. 
Indeed, when all costs (including damage to share value, the status of shareholders and the negotiability 
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of shares, etc.) are considered, the total damage exceeds the savings on direct costs. Another commonly-
given reason claims that the rights issue is intended to strengthen the company’s equity, inter alia, 
following the requests of financial institutions or, alternatively, for the purpose of investment and 
expansion.  
Many studies show that the market’s response to a rights issue is negative and declaration of an issue 
reduces the shares’ value (see Hansen [7], 1989; Eckbo and Masulis [8], 1992; Singh [9], 1997; Slovin et 
al.[10], 2000 and others). In this context, research demonstrates that the damage ranges between 1% and 
5% of the share price. Singhai [10] (2002) even claims that the larger the percentage discount for 
realizing the rights included in the price, in comparison to the share’s market price, the more harm done 
to the share price. 
  
Bebchuk et al. [11] (1998) give examples of how the “expropriation” of minority rights components 
can be more important for the controlling shareholder than his legal rights as a shareholder. In these cases, 
the expropriation becomes the controlling shareholder’s main purpose rather than the profit of the 
company as a whole, which will be shared by all shareholders.  
Pan, Xia and Yu[12] (2008) examined the expropriation of tradable shareholders in rights issuing firms 
with the split share structure in China. Using a sample of 444 rights issues from 1999 to 2004, they found 
that the change in wealth of tradable shareholders is negatively correlated with the change in wealth of 
non tradable shareholders, consistent with an expropriation effect. Additional evidence indicates that the 
expropriation effect in rights issues is exacerbated when the firm is not ultimately controlled by the 
government, the non tradable shareholders do not subscribe the shares of rights issues, or the firm has a 
large second-largest shareholder. 
3. Rights issues in Israel 
Rights issues are becoming a more popular instrument in the Israeli capital market in recent years. 
During 2005-1.2009 public companies in Israel issued rights 58 times (including some repeat issues by 
the same company), while there were only 9 issues during 2000-2004. The website of the Tel Aviv Stock 
Exchange (TASE), where data can be obtained for issues from 2000 to the present, served as the database 
for this study. Therefore, the sample period is 2005-1.2009. Of the 58 issues listed on the TASE 
notifications website, either 46 or 52 issues (if issues that contained rights for both shares and options are 
included) were used as the research sample. The remaining six issues were omitted because the 
companies have been deleted from the exchange and their data is no longer available in the database. 
Issues by dual companies were also omitted.  
Keep in mind that at the end of the sample period, the international financial world, including the 
Israeli capital market, was facing one of the most severe crises in its history. Beyond the context 
described in the literature above regarding the possibility of using financial crises for rights issues that 
harm the minority shareholders, it is vital to understand the specific circumstances of the recent crisis. An 
important part of the minority holdings in the public companies that issued rights during this period, like 
many other companies active in the Israeli capital market in general, is held by institutional investors who 
encountered cash flow problems as a result of the crisis.  
In this context, it is also important to note the opposing incentives for realizing the rights of the 
majority and the minority. While the majority has an incentive to realize their rights, since maintaining or 
increasing their share also preserves, maintains and even increases its ability to enact additional 
“expropriations” in the future, the minority faces an opposite situation. Therefore, there is pressure on the 
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minority shareholders not to realize their rights but rather to sell them at a loss and avoid future damage to 
their shares in the future. From here, it is but a short distance to negative pressure on the shares and 
increasing pressure on the minority shares to sell, in a cyclical pattern. 
4. The empirical foundation 
As we saw above, the professional literature describes several characteristics that impact the potential 
for an “expropriation” process. 
4.1. Negative response of the market – The literature agrees that rights issues are an instrument that may 
harms minority shareholders and, therefore, has a negative impact on the company’s values and 
creates an incentive for minority shareholders to decrease their holdings. 
4.2. Size of the discount/benefit – On one hand, the larger the benefit, the greater the negative pressure 
is likely to be on the share price, meaning that the effect of the expropriation could, apparently, be 
larger. On the other hand, the larger the discount, the easier it is for the minority shareholders to 
raise the resources necessary to realize their rights for shares (including liquidity considerations) 
and/or to take the risk necessary to increase their share holdings, thereby leading to a smaller 
expropriation.  
4.3. Rights issues during a crisis – The existenceof a crisis, whethe r in the company or stock market as 
a whole, may also have an adverse effect on the outcome of an expropriation. However, it is 
important to remember that the literature describes the impact of crises situations and their 
exploitation by controlling shareholders and not ordinary changes, even if very large, in the share 
price.  
4.4. Number of rights issues issued by the company throughout its history – A larger quantity of rights 
issues may indicate that owners of the controlling interest will be willing to use this instrument 
again despite its implications for the minority shares.  
4.5. Character of the holding structure – The existence of a controlling interest that controls the 
hierarchical chain and/or a holdings cross-section (using two or more companies) is also depicted as 
an instrument that can influence the outcome of an expropriation.  
4.6. Neutralizing the participation of some minority or foreign shareholders – When there is an option to 
neutralize the foreign investors, a larger expropriation can be expected. 
On this basis, we can examine if there is an empirical connection between the various characteristics of 
rights issues on the TASE and the resultant expropriation of the holdings of minority shareholders. The 
variables considered in this study are:  
The result of the expropriation (hereinafter, “Y”) was measured by the size of the relative decrease (or 
increase) in the minority’s holdings. The assumption that rights issues are an instrument for raising capital 
that is very likely to lead to a dilution of the minority holdings was examined using a test of significance 
(hereinafter, “C”). A dummy variable (hereinafter, “D1”) was included to distinguish between dilution of 
the minority and an increase in its holding. It acted on the constant and was assigned a value of “1” when 
the minority is diluted and the value “0” in other cases. The extent of the discount/benefit was measured 
using six alternative variables: X11 representing the non weighted size of the benefit, in comparison to the 
price for realizing the share inherent in each right issued; X12, size of the weighted average benefit 
considering the number of rights issued as compared with the number of existing shares for the issue, 
calculated by using the share price divided by the EX price (meaning the weighted share price for the 
benefit inherent in the rights issue); X13, the discount rate as compared to share price that deviates from 
the accepted level described in the literature (20%); X14, the adjusted discount rate when it exceeds 50%; 
X15, the discount rate as compared to the EX price and X16, the benefit ratio defined as the relationship 
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between the number of shares allocated in the rights issue and the number of shares in the company’s 
equity. 
  
The existence of a crisis was measured in the context of stability tests that distinguish between the 
different years included in the sample. The years 2005-2007 were peak years (2005, when the period of 
growth that began in 2003 became firmly established, was especially conspicuous) while 2008-1.2009 are 
a trough, as a result of the crisis described in section 3, above. Furthermore, we examined whether only a 
crisis or significant financial downturn influences the results that dilute the holdings of minority 
shareholders or whether results are also influenced by changes in share prices and market indices. This 
was measured using a group of nine variables: the rate of change in share prices in the month, quarter and 
year preceding announcement of the issue, the rate of change in the TASE 100 index (representing the 
100 largest companies on the TASE) in the month, quarter and year preceding announcement of the issue 
and the rate of change in the share price as compared to the rate of change in the TASE 100 index. These 
variables are represented by X21, X22, X23, X24 , X25, X26, X27, X28, X29, respectively.  
The other factors were measured using appropriate dummy variables. X31 was assigned the value “1” if 
the rights issue was the second or subsequent during the sample period and the value “0,” if not. X32 was 
assigned the value “1” if the rights issue was the third or subsequent during the sample period and the 
value “0,” if not. X33 was assigned the value “1” if the company has pyramid holding structure and the 
value “0,” if not. X34 was assigned the value “1” if the company has cross-section holdings and the value 
“0,” if not. X35 was assigned the value “1” if the issue was conducted in accordance with the amendment 
to the securities regulations that permits exceptional foreign investment and the value “0,” if not. 
Simultaneously, we will attempt to examine if the motivation of controlling shareholders to issue 
rights, with the potential results of the move, is related to the size of their initial holding in the controlling 
interest.  
Table 1: Variables Characteristics 
 Variables Average Min. Max. Median 
Decrease  in minority’s holdings Y  -    5.5% 
Monthly change in share prices  X21 -  -   
Quarterly change in share prices  X22  -   
Discount rate compared to EX 
price 
X15 -  -   
Weighted benefit X12  -   
Benefit ratio X16    
Non weighted benefit X11 -  -   
This table describes the main characteristics of the variables found to effect the various versions of the estimator to assess the 
dilution of the minority shareholder's holdings, in issuance of the share rights of public companies in Israel and during the sample 
period: 2005-1.2009.  Dilution of the holdings of the minority shareholders is defined as positive whereas the increase in the 
holdings of the minority shareholders, stemming from the issuance of the rights, is defined as negative.  Increase in the price of the 
share is defined as positive whereas decrease in the price of the share is defined as negative. Adiscount in relation to the price of the 
EX price is defined as positive whereas a negative discount indicates that the price of realization of the right is higher than the price 
of the EX. The rate of the benefit is defined as positive whereas the rate of the negative benefit indicates that the price of the EX is 
higher than the price of the share on the day it was issued. A discount in relation to the price of realization is defined as positive 
whereas a negative discount means that the price of realization of the right is higher than the price of the share. The table shows to 
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what extent the main variables were characterized by high fluctuation during the sample period in a manner that supports the 
hypothesis that no significant variable was omitted in the estimate and that the remaining unexplained information stems from 
random errors.
5. Findings 
The different regressions used to estimate the impact of rights issues on diluting the holdings of 
minority shareholders (for details of the results, see tables 2 and 3) brought the explanatory coefficient of 
the leading version (version 4, Table 3) to a high level (by the standard of research on capital markets) 2R    ( 2R =0.574) and the statistics to the level of the S.E.=0.141 and D.W.=2.102 (which 
indicates that there is no serial correlation). In this context, it should be noted that this is not a time series 
but rather a cross-section analysis and so the statistical importance of D.W. is low. Despite this, the 
statistics definitely provide an indication that the regression did not disregard a central explanatory 
variable shared by the entire sample and reinforces the possibility that the unexplained half of the 
estimation is indeed the result of random walk, without correlation between the issues because a 
significant variable is lacking. Study of Table 1 shows the extent to which large fluctuations characterize 
the central variables in the estimation. These fluctuations, like the D.W. test, support the assumption the 
regression did not disregard a central explanatory variable and that the remaining unexplained 
information (47.9% in regression 4) is the result of random walk. In any case, most of the central 
variables that were found significant in the various regressions, as described below, are stable across the 
different regressions and floatation signs. Moreover, the correlation matrix showed that there is no 
possible multi-collinearity problem.   
As noted, the constant, together with the dummy variable that acts on it, is an important parameter for 
examining the accuracy of the research assumption that rights issues lead to a dilution in the holdings of 
the minority by the controlling interest (which is accepted in the economic literature). It contributed to the 
stability of the estimation and distinguished between diluting the minority’s share and increasing it. These 
two were found to be significant and substantive in all regressions and their cumulative rate reached 0.186 
in the leading regression (regression 4, see Table 3) and 0.081 in the absence of the dummy variable 
(regression 3), which means that a rights issue, by its very nature, is likely to significantly dilute the 
minority, at a rate varying between 8-19% of their rights prior to the issue, before considering the 
circumstances of particular issues, the characteristics of the various companies and changing market 
conditions. Considering the results of rights issues, this result is not surprising. As noted above, a large 
majority (35 out of 46) of the issues included in the sample led to dilution, while three out of the 
remaining 11 ended with a negligible increase (approximately 0.25% or less) in the minority’s share. 
Similarly, it should be emphasized that the total sample was characterized by an average dilution in 
minority rights of approximately 8.3%, while the average dilution in the issues that ended in dilution was 
approximately 14.9% of the minority rights (and increased by appropriate coefficients when companies 
chose to issue two or three rights issues). Against this background, the strong language used in the 
literature to describe dilution, “expropriation,” seems more reasonable. It further supports the research 
assumption, accepted in literature, that the timing, conditions and instrument chosen to raise capital do 
not work equally for the controlling interests and for the minority shareholders. 
The group of variables relating to the discount/benefit inherent in the issue were largely represented by 
the ratio between the discount and the EX price variable and in the other regressions by the ratio between 
the discount on the realization prize. Practically, the ratio between the discount and the EX price is the 
most important variable in this group because it is the weighted percentage discount of the benefit 
inherent in the issue. The strength of this variable was found to be negative and in the leading regression 
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reached 0.021. The average discount in the sample was negative, -11% (a negative discount means that 
the average realization price for the rights issue was higher than the EX price). However, the average was 
tilted heavily by a single issue in which there was a negative discount of 1600%; when this issue was 
neutralized, the average positive discount was 24.3%. The average rate of dilution in the sample was 
8.3%, meaning, for example, that increasing the discount (in relation to the EX price) from 24.3% to 
25.3% (a 4.12% change in the discount rate) will decrease the dilution rate by approximately 0.021% 
from 8.3% to 8.279% (meaning a change of approximately 0.25% in the strength of the dilution). This 
means that there is moderate flexibility of approximately 6.2% between the variables at this point. This is 
also the source of the negative influence on the dilution (because the discount makes it easier for minority 
shareholders to realize their rights) that effectively overrides the positive influence on the dilution (caused 
by its negative impact on the share price) without neglecting the influence of other explanatory variables. 
It should be emphasized that this result is consistent with the possibility that risk-aversion and liquidity 
gaps influence the behavior of minority shareholders (see below). 
The dummy variables for the third issue were found to be significant and substantial. Clearly, a third 
issue indicates a willingness to use rights issues repeatedly despite the ramifications for the minority 
shareholders and therefore, as expected, the dummy was found to be significant and substantial, having a 
positive flexibility of 0.207 in the leading regression. The meaning of this result is that the degree of 
dilution can be expected to increase by approximately 21% for a third issue, beyond the usual dilution of 
approximately 29% when considering the constant and even reaching approximately 40% when 
considering the dummy variable. At the same time, we note that the dummy variable for pyramid 
holdings, which was not found to be significant, is characterized by a negative tendency of approximately 
7% because of the high correlation between this variable and the dummy variable for the third issue, as 
reported in the tables. Effectively, they can be considered together, bringing the dilution rate to 22-32%. 
The group of crisis-related variables is characterized by differences between the effect of dummy 
variables for distinguishing between years or periods and the variables for changes in share price or 
market index. This distinction is also clearly reflected in the literature. As noted, dummy variables were 
added for each year of the sample period (meaning, that the dummy variables were assigned, one after the 
other, the value of “1” for issues during specific year and the value of “zero” for the other issues). Some 
years in the sample were peak years and others slowdown and even recession. Among the dummy 
variables, the variable for 2005 (hereinafter, D3), which was an exceptional peak year, was found to be 
significant, negative (meaning it reduced the dilution result) and substantial. Despite this, its main 
influence is dependent on two exceptional observations that produced an exceptional increase in the rate 
of minority holdings. Although there were other peak years in the sample, 2005 was a unique year when 
the growth wave in the economy that began in 2003 was firmly established. The rate of the dummy 
variable for 2005 was 0.145 (meaning an almost 15% decrease in the average dilution calculated in the 
estimations) while the dummy variable for 2008, despite the clear positive tendency in some stages of the 
estimation (meaning that it acted to increase the intensity of the dilution) loses its significance in the 
presence of the other variables included, especially the dummy variable for distinguishing between 
dilution and non-dilution and the dummy variable for third issues. It seems, therefore, that the inherent 
positive information corresponds to the explanatory strength of the other variables. Furthermore, it is 
important to remember that the international financial crisis that began in early 2008 became increasingly 
severe in Israel throughout the year and reached its lowest point in late 2008. Therefore, it is likely that 
the increased strength of the dilution caused by the crisis was not sufficiently prominent in the limited 
number of issues held in late 2008 and early 2009, at least not in a manner that deviates from the strong 
trend towards dilution already present in other variables. In a similar manner, the dummy variable for the 
other years was not found to be significant. Further, it should be stressed that the stability variable for 
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2005 did not significantly change the flexibility of the other central parameters in the estimation (see 
Table 3).  
The variables relating to share prices, market indexes and excess share earnings were not significant in 
any of the regressions tested. This result means that the strong tendency towards diluting the holding is 
not effected by ordinary fluctuations in the share price and market in general at any specific time. In this 
context, note that the sample included a reasonable mix of situations with increasing and decreasing share 
prices with 29 cases (out of 46) in which the share price dropped during the month preceding the issue 
and 31 cases in which the share price dropped during the previous quarter. Therefore, it is difficult to 
unequivocally ascribe the result to the character of the sample. It is likely that the lack of significance is 
indeed evidence that fluctuations in the share price alone, in a stable market environment (as existed 
during most of the sample), is not strong enough to have a significant impact on the dilution results. 
However, as the literature describes, a strong peak or trough in the market and/or a sufficiently dominant 
share can have a significant impact. It is reasonable that a strong peak or trough has a different, 
substantial influence on the impact of risk-aversion and liquidity gaps between the controlling interest and 
the minority shareholders.  
A contribution test was also conducted between regression 1 and regression 4. The results refute the 
assumption of zero (the result was 3.63 while the threshold for 95% significance was 2.3). This means 
that on all accepted levels of significance, the peak in 2005 had a clear impact on the estimation. 
Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between 2005 and other years.  
The results of the stability tests, like the results from variables in the discount/benefit group, support 
the assumption that risk-adversity and, probably, liquidity difficulties are among the reasons for our 
findings. In the discount/benefit group of variables, it is apparent that reducing the amount of additional 
investment required to realize the rights (a discount that reduces both risk and the amount of liquidity 
needed) was important. In the stability tests, it was evident that there was indeed a negative impact on 
dilution in 2005, which was characterized by a major peak (that presumably diminished any liquidity 
difficulties, at least for the institutional investors among the minority shareholders). The dummy 
variable’s positive impact on dilution in 2008 (a trough year) is discussed above.  
The remaining dummy variables were found to be insignificant. In some cases (for example, the 
dummy variable that tested the impact of neutralizing foreign investors), it is likely that this is the result 
of the small sample size and information that overlapped with other variables. In the future, when a larger 
Israeli sample is available, it is possible that there will be more significant results for this variable. 
Similarly, the size of the controlling interest’s holding was found insufficient. It seems that a controlling 
interest’s decision to issue rights is not motivated by the size of its holding. 
The possibility that deviant observations might have had considerable influence on the results was 
tested by removing 5-10% of the extreme observations from the sample (several alternatives). Removal of 
the extremes did not lead to significant changes in the main findings. The only exception was the dummy 
variable’s loss of significance for 2005. The existence of an assumption of homodoxy was also tested. 
This assumption was examined using the White test, as recommended by Ramanathan [13] (1998), and 
the results do not refute the assumption on all accepted levels of significance.  
Calculation of the alternative regressions, as described above, based on a sample of 52 issues that also 
included six rights issues with a parallel distribution of options (without remuneration) yielded results 
similar to the other regressions, even though they are apparently, of lower quality because of the 
1338  Yaron Zelekha and Eyal Sharabi / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 24 (2011) 1329–1342
artificially weighted value of the option that is required in order to neutralize them by artificially reducing 
the price for realizing the options. 
  
Table 2: Estimation of Rights Issues Impact on Diluting Minority Rights in Israel 

 Variables Regression 1 
Coefficients 
(t values) 
Regression 2 
Coefficients 
(t values) 
Regression 3 
Coefficients 
(t values) 
Constant C -  
-
-  
-


Dilution/non dilution 
dummy  
D1 



- 
Monthly change in share 
prices  
X21 

- - 
Quarterly change in share 
prices  
X22 -  
-
- - 
Third sequence issue 
dummy 
X32 





Discount rate compared to 
EX price 
X15 -  
-
-  
-
- 
Weighted benefit X12 - - -  
-
Benefit ratio X16 - - 

Pyramid holding dummy X33 -  
-
- - 
- 
2R   
- 
2R   
- S.E.   
- D.W.   
This table describes the linear regression equations in whose framework the variable explained is the rate of change in the 
holdings of the minority shareholders (dilution of the holdings is defined as positive), stemming from the issue of rights by public 
companies during the sample period 2005-1.2009 in the Israeli capital market, whereas the explanatory variables were derived from 
the economic literature which describes factors which may effect the results of the dilution, excluding the stability variables which 
test the effect of the various periods. 
Table 3: Stability Test of Rights Issues Impact on Diluting Minority Rights in Israel 
 Variables Regression 
Coefficients 
(t values) 
Constant C -  
-
Dilution/non dilution dummy  D1 

Third sequence issue dummy X32 
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
Discount rate compared to EX 
price 
X15 -  
-
Pyramid holding dummy X33 -  
-
Yearly dummy for 2005 D3 -  
-
- 
2R 
- 
2R 
- S.E. 
- D.W. 
This table describes stability tests carried out on the leading version of the estimator without stability variables for the various 
periods (Version 1), while including dummy variables to assess each individual year of the sample period. The goal of the estimators 
is to test if the periods of high and low tide in the financial markets affect the results of the dilution and if this effect is significant. In 
addition, an assessment was made of the contribution, the results of which are described in Section 5.
6. Summary and conclusions 
The Israeli economy is a small, centralized economy, in which most of its public traded companies 
have an absolute controlling core. Therefore, it is increasingly important to understand the parameters that 
influence the results of rights issues and whether they usually lead to a significant “expropriation” of 
minority rights. The economic literature, which describes the agency problem inherent in rights issues at 
length, does not include an abundance of empirical studies on the results of rights issues. To the best of 
our knowledge, the literature does not include any studies in a developed country that examine the 
“expropriation” of minority holdings that can result from a rights issue (and only one study in an 
undeveloped country, China), but rather quantitative, empirical examinations of the effect (usually 
negative) of rights issues on the price of shares. 
Against this background, the current findings are important and have both local and international 
ramifications. The findings support the assumption, which is accepted in the economic literature that 
considers rights issues negatively because they dilute the holdings of minority shareholders. These 
findings demonstrate that a significant majority of rights issues do indeed end with dilution, within an 
environment of negative share prices that is created by the rights issue itself. This degree of dilution is 
influenced by several factors including the extent of the discount/benefit inherent in the rights. A smaller 
discount/benefit (and certainly a negative benefit) leads, on a moderate level, to increased dilution while a 
larger discount will reduce the dilution. Other influential factors are the existence of a significant peak in 
the market and/or company, which decreases the level of risk, improves the shareholders’ liquidity and 
acts to reduce the dilution. Conversely, a significant downturn apparently leads to the opposite results, as 
described in the literature. Frequent use of rights issues, which are an unpopular instrument for raising 
capital, also acts to increase the intensity of the dilution. 
  
It should be stressed that dilution of the minority shareholding, in the form of not realizing rights and 
as a consequence of realizing part of the original investment in cash, does not happen at the time and 
under the conditions that the minority shareholders would consider optimal for themselves; rather, the 
controlling interest selects the time and conditions for everyone. From the findings, it also emerges that 
the gap in risk-aversion and, possibly, liquidity of the minority shareholders (as compared to the 
controlling shareholders) are also among the factors that create the dilution phenomenon. In this context, 
it is clear that the information gap and their control of the situation give the controlling shareholders an 
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advantage and reduces, from their perspective, the influence of the risk inherent in the investment (in 
comparison to minority shareholders), while the time the controlling shareholders choose for the rights 
issue will be better suited to their sources of liquidity than to those of the minority shareholders. In short, 
this is also the core of the damage done to the minority rights.  
These findings should not be taken to mean that a rights issue is a categorically illegitimate tool. There 
are situations in which a company that needs to raise capital has no other choice available. However, the 
findings do show clearly that the use of this instrument for raising capital does not leave an equal imprint 
on all stakeholders: the majority or controlling shareholders who realized their rights increase their 
investment while a majority of the minority shareholders were diluted. 
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Appendix A: Variables Calculations Formulas 
1.
1
21
Q
QQ
Y
−
=      
Where,  
Y - Decrease in minority’s holdings 
1Q - Minority holdings prior to the right issues offering
2Q - Minority holdings after issues exercise  
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2.
21
2211
3
**
nn
SnSnS
+
+
=      
Where, 
1S - Share price prior to the right issues offering 
2S - Exercise price 
3S - EX price 
1n - Number of shares entitled for rights issue  
2n -Number of issued shares in the right issues 
3.
1
21
11 S
SS
X
−
=      
Where,  
11X -  Non weighted benefit 
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4. 1
3
1
12 −= S
S
X         
Where, 
12X - Weighted benefit 
5.
1
31
15 S
SS
X
−
=      
Where, 
15X - Discount rate compared to EX price 
